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NOTES
Up in the Cloud: Finding Common
Ground in Providing for Law
Enforcement Access to Data Held
by Cloud Computing Service
Providers
ABSTRACT

Cloud computing is an everyday part of the modern world; a
technology that is increasingly transcending international
borders. Disregarding international borders allows cloud
computing to operate more efficiently and thus provides better
service to users. Yet, the global nature of cloud computing raises
a question-what happens if multiple countries apply facially
similar laws to cloud computing providers differently? This
scenario is common, especially in the context of law enforcement
seeking access to cloud computing data. The United States and
the United Kingdom have similar laws regarding the
government's ability to acquire users' data. Importantly, neither
law explicitly addresses the question of if and how the law can be
applied in a setting where traditionalphysical borders are being
ignored. Currently, both laws focus on the location of the cloud
service provider. Instead, these laws should focus on the user's
nationality,or the locationfrom where the data was created. This
approach would alleviate some of the problems existing today,
including the trend toward data localization through increased
regulationof cloud computing. However, this solution will not be
successful unless the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process is
reformed as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a ubiquitous feature in today's increasingly
connected world. A consumer uses cloud computing when accessing
emails through Google mail, streaming songs on Spotify or iTunes, or
working on papers in Google Docs. 1 Individual consumers are not the
only ones using cloud computing services. According to a 2012 survey,
eight in ten companies use cloud computing services as part of their
information technology (IT) operations as a way to increase efficiency
and decrease operating costs. 2 Simply put, anytime someone accesses
data stored on the Internet and not on a computer hard drive, that data
'3
is being accessed using the "cloud."
Despite its ubiquity, the rise of cloud computing has not been
without controversy. For example, cloud computing implicates the
tension between individuals' data privacy rights and national security
concerns. 4 Apart from domestic citizens' concerns over law

1.
See Mark Koba, Cloud Computing 101: Learning the Basics, CNBC (June 2,
2011, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43077233 [https://perma.cc/THQ9-6PQA]
(archived Oct. 11, 2016) (describing the ways consumers normally access the cloud
including email, social networks, and online software); see also Michael Miller,
Comparing Google Docs with Competing Cloud Computing Applications, QUE (Feb. 9,
2009), http://www.quepublishing.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1323244 [https://perma.cc/
E692-77D6] (archived Oct. 11, 2016) (discussing several cloud computing applications
for writing including Google Docs).
2.
See Ned Smith, Why More Businesses Are Using Cloud Computing, CNBC
(July 25, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48319526 [https://perma.cc/BA9SVDCZ] (archived Oct. 11, 2016) (summarizing the findings of a survey sponsored by an
IT industry trade association).
3.
See Koba, supra note 1 (noting that "the cloud" is merely "a metaphor for the
Internet").
4.
For an overview of the many issues currently surrounding technology,
privacy, and law enforcement in an international context see Safety, Privacy, and the
Internet Paradox: Solutions at Hand and the Need for New Trans-Atlantic Rules,
MICROSOFT CORPORATE BLOGS (Jan. 20, 2015), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
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enforcement access, cloud computing also raises questions over the
extraterritorial reach of countries' laws and its effect on international
5
jurisdiction.
The tension between cloud computing and its implications on
international jurisdiction remained a largely academic issue until
recently. In 2014, the Southern District of New York decided In re
Matterof a Warrantto Search a CertainE-mailAccount Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation6 ["The Microsoft case"], a case
which highlights the international legal consequences of cloud
computing. At issue was whether the United States could compel
Microsoft to hand over a foreign person's email data stored on a
Microsoft server in a foreign country merely because Microsoft is
headquartered in the United States. 7 A magistrate judge ruled that the
United States has the power to compel Microsoft to hand over the data,
irrespective of any extraterritorial concerns, because of the powers
given to law enforcement under the Stored Communications Act
(SCA).8 The magistrate judge's decision was upheld on appeal by the
district court. 9 However, in 2016, the Second Circuit overturned the
warrant compelling Microsoft to hand over the data stored overseas. 10
The court found that Congress did not intend the SCA, the main law
covering law enforcement access to computer data, to apply
11
extraterritorially.
This Note does not analyze the outcome of the case or the Second
Circuit's reasoning. Rather, the discussion of the case illustrates the
issues that must be resolved by the United States and other countries
when deciding how to handle the acquisition of data stored in the cloud.
The questions raised by the Microsoft case will arise more frequently
as law enforcement agencies around the world rely on increasingly
outdated statutes to gain access to information stored on the cloud.
Currently, the international community's focus is on the United States'

issues/2015/01/20brad-smith-time-nations-adapt-laws-reflect-todays-technology/
[https://perma.cc/RJ9H-YR7A] (archived Oct. 11, 2016).

5.

See generally Vineeth Narayanan, Harnessingthe Cloud: InternationalLaw

Implications of Cloud-Computing, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 783 (2012).

6.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft Case].
7.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 470.
8.
Ellen Nakashima, Judge OrdersMicrosoft to Turn Over DataHeld Overseas,
9.
WASH. POST (July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/judge-orders-microsoft-to-turn-over-data-held-overseas/2014/07/31/
b07c4952-18d4-1le4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265-story.html [https://perma.cc/GT38-6R8F]
(archived Oct. 11, 2016) (reporting on the "surprise" bench ruling by the district court
judge in upholding the magistrate judge's decision).
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
10.
by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
11.
Id. at 201.
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allegedly broad powers to access data anywhere in the world. 12 As will
be discussed, the United States is not the only country with ambiguous
laws that grant law enforcement broad powers. Consequently, if these
issues are left unresolved, other countries could start seeing more cases
like the Microsoft case.
This Note examines several issues related to law enforcement
access to cloud computing. First, a comparison with the United
Kingdom's statute on law enforcement access shows that the SCA is
not unique in the powers it gives to law enforcement, at least textually.
Next, this Note examines whether relying on the traditional principles
of international jurisdiction can help ameliorate the current issues
surrounding law enforcement access to something that is inherently
international in scope.
A discussion on the way countries approach this issue not only
affects diplomatic relations but also affects the future of the entire
cloud computing industry, which is comprised mainly of U.S.
companies. 13 Part II discusses the basics of cloud computing to show
why it naturally implicates international concerns. Part 11 also briefly
describes the Microsoft case before concluding with a summary on the
general principles of international jurisdiction. Part III compares
analogous U.S. and UK statutes covering law enforcement access to
the cloud to illustrate why it is wrong for foreign leaders and other
commentators to single out the United States for its allegedly broad
surveillance powers. Despite the favorable ruling for Microsoft, the
Second Circuit's decision does not fix the greater international issues
raised by cloud computing. While this juxtaposition is restricted to only
two countries, it shows that a new approach or solution is needed. Part
IV discusses possible solutions to the problem of law enforcement
access to the cloud. In the end, this Note provides a solution that is not
only possible to achieve, but also leads to greater certainty for
businesses and respect for international norms.
II.

SETTING THE STAKES FOR WHY CLOUD COMPUTING Is DIFFERENT

A. W~hat Is Cloud Computing?
To understand how cloud computing has given rise to the
controversy of law enforcement access to data in the cloud, one should
understand what cloud computing is and how it works. According to

12.
Nakashima, supra note 9 (noting that the district court's decision will most
likely lead to more outrage from foreign officials).
13.
See Katharine Kendrick, Risky Business: Data Localization, FORBES (Feb.
19, 2015 5:08 PM), http://www.forbes.comlsites/realspin/2015/02/19/risky-business-datalocalization/#330e5ca48c8b [https://perma.ccMDR9-UUFM] (archived Oct. 11, 2016)
(discussing Germany's efforts in protecting data from NSA's reach).
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the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the technical
definition of "cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources ... that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort." 14 To put it another way, cloud
computing's focus is with the on-demand delivery of computing power,
software, storage services, and other platforms to customers over the
Internet. 15
As mentioned, most people are probably familiar with cloud
computing because they interact with it every day when accessing
emails on Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, or Yahoo!. These programs, also
known as "email clients," house data on servers that are separate from
your computer.16 Provided one has Internet access, one can access
emails stored on an email client anywhere in the world. Email clients,
which in general work on the same principles as cloud computing, are
just one example of what cloud computing is. Essentially, cloud
computing gives consumers and businesses the ability to use programs
and save data over the Internet rather than on a personal hard drive
located on the user's computer. This can result in cost savings on IT
operations for businesses and provide users the benefit of data
mobility.17
Currently, there are three types of cloud computing services
offered by companies: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a
Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).18 Each service
is a type of "level" in the cloud, differentiated by the amount of control
the user has over their information and how involved the cloud service
provider is.19 The SaaS level provides users access to web applications

14.
PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145 (2011),

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/LegacylSP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X76X-2YDA] (archived Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter NIST].
15.

GRACE LEWIS, BASICS ABOUT CLOUD COMPUTING, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.:

SOFTWARE ENG'G INST. (Sept. 2010), http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset-files/
WhitePaper/2010 019 001 28877.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYG4-HKXN] (archived Oct. 11,
2016).
16.
ALEXA HUTH & JAMES CEBULA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S
COMPUT. EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, THE BASICS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1 (2011),

https:/www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CloudComputingHuth
Cebula.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH68-XM4Z] (archived Oct. 11, 2016) (describing what the
"cloud" is).
17.
See Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG (May 3, 2016),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp [https://perma.cc/5WWA-M4U4]
(archived Nov. 1, 2016).
18.
HUTH & CEBULA, supra note 16, at 2-3 (providing an overview of the three
basics types of cloud service providers).
19.
See id.; see also Narayanan, supra note 5, at 786 (describing briefly how each
cloud service differs).
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developed by third parties. 20 Examples include Google Apps and Web
22
Outlook. 21 In this level, users have the least control over their data.
PaaS offers a space over the Internet where developers and other users
can create their own applications and Web programs. 23 Finally, IaaS
deals "with computational infrastructure" (e.g., storage, computation,
and communications), meaning that the cloud service provider hosts
the IT infrastructure of a user on its outside servers. 24 IaaS gives the
user the most control over the cloud. 25 Overall, consumers are most
likely to use SaaS models because applications are already developed,
thus saving time and money. Meanwhile, businesses, including many
small businesses, might be more inclined to use IaaS models because
the models allow them to have as much computational capability as
larger businesses without having to pay for the required physical
infrastructure; the business only has to pay for the storage space and
26
bandwidth used.
All three services share five essential characteristics: on-demand
self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity,
and measured service. 27 These characteristics give cloud computing
"the illusion of infinite computing resources available on demand," but,
in order to achieve this illusion, cloud service providers "must be able
' 28
to move resources across servers as quickly and freely as possible.
For example, to achieve economies of scale, a cloud service provider
might decide to process user data through a subcontractor, who might
be located in a country different from both the service provider and
user. 29 Furthermore, cloud service providers, in the quest to maintain
high-speed services, might create more and more servers across a
wider geographic area in order to maintain an efficient system. 30 While
the cloud service provider is making all of these decisions behind the
scenes, the user who has entrusted their data to the provider might not

20.

LEWIS, supra note 15, at 2.

21.
Id. (using Google Apps as an example of a Software as a Service capability).
22.
See HUTH & CEBULA, supranote 16, at 3 (explaining the le ,el of control over
data the user has in each cloud service).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. (noting that the level of control increases from SaaS, to PaaS, to IaaS).
26.
Id.
27.
NIST, supra 14, at 2.
28.
Narayanan, supra note 5, at 786-87.
29.
See Cloud Computing, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR,
https:/secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/QA/QAl0
(last
visited Oct. 11, 2016) [https:/perma.cc/726K-TTFV] (archived Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter
EDPS] (explaining that in the context of cloud computing, the service provider makes
many decisions regarding the processing of data, including but not limited to the use of
sub-contractors); see also Narayanan, supranote 5, at 787 (describing how cloud service
providers might join resources in order to take advantage of economies of scale).
30.
Narayanan, supra note 5, at 787.

20.161

UP IN THE CLOUD

1423

have any idea who is actually processing and storing their data, or
31
where it is actually located, especially when using a SaaS provider.
Global on-demand access to data and resource pooling are just
some of the features of cloud computing that raise issues involving
international law. From a data privacy perspective, the European
Union has stricter laws regarding data privacy than the United States.
Thus, companies must be cognizant of where and how EU user data is
stored and processed, as compared to U.S. citizens' data. Indeed, the
Microsoft case highlights how cloud computing's lack of physical
borders raises international jurisdiction concerns due to differing
approaches to law enforcement access.
B. The Microsoft Case
The Microsoft case illustrates the potential problems of cloud
computing, especially when a party might find itself subject to the
jurisdiction of multiple countries with opposing laws. Despite the
Second Circuit's recent ruling, the issues brought up in the case are far
from settled. In short, the case involves a warrant/subpoena, pursuant
to the SCA, that compelled Microsoft to hand over the contents of an
email stored on one of its foreign subsidiary's servers in Ireland in
connection with a narcotics investigation. 32 The warrant issued
required Microsoft to hand over all email data in its control, regardless
of the data's stored location. 33 Based on the broad request, Microsoft
filed for a motion to quash the warrant with respect to the user data
stored in Ireland. 34 Many commentators have noted that the warrant
did not offer any information as to the identity of the defendant,
leading many to speculate that the subject of the investigation is a non35
U.S. citizen.
Microsoft argued before the Second Circuit that allowing this type
of search would violate Ireland's sovereignty because the United States
would essentially be conducting a search abroad without international

31.
See Shamim Hossain, Cloud Computing Basics, THOUGHTS ON THE CLOUD
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.thoughtsoncloud.com/2014/02/cloud-computing-basics/
[https://perma.cc/C7H6-RW73] (archived Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that generally consumers
do not know where their data is processed, except for that fact that consumers may be
able to specify where data is stored in some circumstances).
32.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d
Cir. Dec. 8, 2014).
33.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2016).
34.
Id.
35.
Orin Kerr, A Different Take on the Second Circuit's Microsoft Case,
WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/20558/8520/a-different-take-on-the-second-circuits-microsoft-warrant-case/?utm ter
m=.afe6eal2b6ea [https:!perma.cc/3THJ-GZV6] (archived Nov. 1, 2016).
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cooperation. 36 Microsoft likened the stored data to documents located
in a deposit box in a bank in Ireland. 37 The United States could not
retrieve the deposit box contents without approval from Ireland. 38
Likewise, Microsoft argued that because the email data's "physical"
location was in Ireland, the United States could not unilaterally gain
access to the email contents. 39 The government and the magistrate
judge who upheld the order both concluded that there was no
extraterritorial application of the search warrant because the issue is
who has control over the data; accordingly, they viewed the "physical"
location of the data as irrelevant. 40 The magistrate judge also agreed
that putting territorial restrictions on warrants issued under the SCA
41
would greatly hamper the government's ability to investigate crimes.
Further, the magistrate judge addressed the argument that the
government needed to issue the warrant pursuant to the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty ("MLAT") with Ireland, which provides specific
procedures each country must follow before executing a warrant
abroad.42 The judge stated that requiring the government to constantly
refer to the MLAT process would also constrain law enforcement's
43
ability to do its job.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that the warrant could not
compel Microsoft to hand over the user data held in Ireland. 44 Looking
to both the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history, the
Second Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend for the SCA to
apply extraterritorially. 45 Although the case is finished, the issues
brought up are far from resolved. For instance, nothing is stopping
another circuit court from finding that the SCA does allow
extraterritorial warrants. Until Congress or the Supreme Court acts,
the international issues surrounding cloud computing will continue to
crop up.

36.
Brief for Appellant at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2d
Cir. Dec. 8, 2014).
37.
Id. at 1-4.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 18-19.
40.
See Microsoft Case, supra note 6, at 472 (concluding that a subpoena under
the SCA "requires the recipient to produce information in its possession, custody, or
control regardless of the location of that information").
41.
Id. at 474 ("[Tlhe burden on the Government would be substantial, and law
enforcement efforts would be seriously impeded.").
42.
Id. at 474-75.
43.
See id. at 475 (noting that the MLAT process is "burdensome and uncertain").
44.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 201.
45.
Id. at 211 (noting that Congress did not give any affirmative indication in
the legislative history to suggest the statute should apply extraterritorially).
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C. Principlesof Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw
An understanding of the foundational principles of jurisdiction in
international law helps shed light on possible solutions to the problems
posed by cloud computing. Principles of jurisdiction are important
because they reflect how each country justifies its power to create and
enforce its laws. No one seriously questions the ability of a state to
create and enforce its laws within its own boundaries. However, when
crafting laws that might have an unintended effect outside of the
state's boundaries, or when making laws designed to purposefully
stretch beyond those boundaries, reliance on a principle of jurisdiction
is important to prevent diplomatic tensions. There are certain
international principles, or norms, that countries observe if they seek
to pass laws that might have what is called an extraterritorial effect.
Thus, how a state justifies the exercise of its laws extraterritorially
(i.e., beyond its own borders) can affect not only those residing within
the country but also actors in the international community.
Traditionally, there are five principles of international jurisdiction: the
the
territorial principle, the nationality principle, the effects principle,
46
passive personality principle, and the protective principle.
The territorialprinciple is the cornerstone of states' power to
legislate, adjudicate, and enforce laws both domestically and
internationally. 47 This concept supports states' power to' make and
enforce laws within their geographic region. 48 Generally, under this
principle, a state is free to apply its laws to anyone, domestic or foreign,
located within the state. 49 This principle is the least controversial form
50
of jurisdiction in international law, and rarely leads to disputes.
However, over time, states have expanded this principle to exert

46.
See, e.g., AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and
Procedural Concerns, in BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW II.A-2 (Diane Marie
Amann ed., 2014), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf
(outlining the five basic principles governing the U.S. government's ability "to make its
laws applicable to persons, conduct, relations, or interests"). One should note, however,
that some sources classify the effects principle as a subset of one of the other principles
and posit that the fifth principle is the universality principle, which focuses on conduct
"recognized by the community of nations as of 'universal concern."' Id. However, Section
402 the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations lists five bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe and seemingly endorses the effects principle as its own bases of jurisdiction.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). The

Restatement does acknowledge the existence of universal jurisdiction, but notes that the
principle is applied to exceptional offenses "such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism..."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
47.
ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2d ed. 2010).

48.

Narayanan, supranote 5, at 790.

49.
AUST, supra note 47, at 43.
50.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)
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jurisdiction over people or entities abroad if they have sufficient
51
contacts with the state.
The scope of the principle is ostensibly based on geography and
physical borders. 52 However, based on each country's interests and
customs, this principle can be expanded to give domestic laws
extraterritorial effect, even if courts state that a law is not being
applied extraterritorially. 53 This creates a certain irony in the
international context, and different views regarding the breadth of the
territorial principle can give rise to heated debates. 54 While this
tension between competing views on the scope of the territorial
principle has always existed in some form for decades, the rise of cloud
computing exacerbates the tension because the data and technology
are more ephemeral than the static concept of physical borders.
The nationality principle, also called the active personality
principle, entitles a state to exercise its jurisdiction over its nationals,
whether they are located at home or abroad. 55 This principle is
recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (the
Restatement) in Section 402, which lays out the various bases for the
jurisdiction to prescribe. 56 The nationality principle has naturally been
rooted in the concept that the state has the authority to exert power
over a specific group of people (e.g., a specific nationality), wherever
located. 57 Historically, this has been uncontroversial; however,
multinational corporations do not fit in this traditional basis for
jurisdiction. 58 With the increase in companies that offer cloud
computing services, which operate on servers across the globe,
difficulties arise when trying to determine which state has
jurisdiction. 59 For example, if it can be determined that states have
concurrent jurisdiction over the same cloud computing provider, which

51.
52.

AUST, supranote 47, at 43.
See id. at 44.

53.

CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2008) (noting

that competing normative views may give rise to different interpretations by countries,
thus creating more problems than the "basic" principle would suggest).
54.
Id.
55.
56.

AUST, supra note 47, at 44-45.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST.

1987) ("Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to ... the
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory .... ").
57.
58.

RYNGAERT, supra note 53, at 91.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 cmt. a (AM. LAW

INST. 1987) ("This section reflects the recognition that multinational enterprises do not
fit neatly into the traditional bases of jurisdiction, [under] § 402.").
59.
See Gartner Says Physical Location of Data Will Become Increasingly
Irrelevantin Post-Snowden Era,GARTNER (July 2, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/
newsroom/idI2787417
[https://perma.cc/FK2Y-3PAV]
(archived Oct. 17, 2016)
(discussing the future problems with data location and sovereignty).
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jurisdiction must the provider comply with if the jurisdictions have
conflicting laws? 60
The effects principle has a somewhat murkier definition in
international law, although it is conceptually similar to the nationality
principle discussed above. 61 The principle grants a state jurisdiction
over persons, entities, or activities that have a substantial effect within
the state's territory, even if the person, entity, or activity is outside the
state's territory.6 2 For example, in the United States, this principle is
applied to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based companies.6 3 Even if thd
subsidiary is incorporated in a foreign country, the subsidiary is still
subject to U.S. laws because of the United States' belief that a foreign
4
subsidiary still has a large enough effect within the United States.6
This exercise of jurisdiction has become increasingly controversial as a
foreign subsidiary can be subject to competing, sometimes
countervailing, state laws. 65 As mentioned above, this poses a
dilemma, especially if each state has opposing economic laws and the
company, in complying with one set of laws, is forced to ignore the other
state's laws.
The passive personalityprinciple, applied mostly in the criminal
context, establishes state jurisdiction over any act committed by a
person outside the state's territory if the victim of the act is a national
of the state.66 Under this principle, a state would have jurisdiction
even if the person who committed the act was not a national of the
state. 67 Some commentators have described this as "the most
aggressive basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. '6 8 As the Restatement
notes, "[tihe principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary
torts or crimes." 69 For instance, today, the passive personality
principle has been used to justify the jurisdiction of U.S. laws over
terrorists and other organized attacks committed against U.S.
nationals abroad. 70

60.
See THE CHERTOFF GROUP, LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO EVIDENCE IN THE
CLOUD ERA 13 (2015) [hereinafter CHERTOFF GROUP] (discussing the legal problems for
service providers in today's world).
61.
See AUST, supra note 47, at 45.
62.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST.

1987).
63.
See AUST, supra note 47, at 47.
64.
But see id. (noting that the United States recognizes the effects principle
when applying antitrust laws).
65.
Id.
66.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).

67.
68.

Id.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 53, at 92.

69.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).

70.
See id.; see also AUST, supra note 47, at 44 (discussing the current
applications of the passive personality principle).
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The protective principle supports jurisdiction with respect to
"certain conduct outside [a state's] territory by persons not its
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a
limited class of other state interests." 71 Examples of conduct that
generally fall within this principle include "espionage, counterfeiting
of the state's seal or currency, falsification of official documents....
and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws." 72 The
United States or the European Union would probably not apply the
protective principle to laws covering cloud service providers since
states reserve the use of the protective principle for only a small set of
73
crimes.
In the end, states can rely on any one of these principles when
drafting laws to enable law enforcement to access certain cloud
computing data abroad. Whether or not other states will accept the use
of any one of these principles is another matter. Furthermore, states
do not even apply the principles in the same way, as will be discussed
below. All of this leads to a problem of uncertainty for cloud computing
service providers who might be unsure how each country will apply
their laws. Therefore, when it comes to providing for law enforcement
access to cloud data, a common approach must be taken to ensure
stability and certainty. What that approach is, and whether it will
work, will be discussed further in Part IV.
III. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED
KINGDOM

This Part will compare the primary law in the United States
dealing with law enforcement access to cloud data, the SCA, with the
analogous law in the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000. This comparison, while limited to only the United
States and United Kingdom, is meant to illustrate that the issue with
the cloud is not relegated to only the United States-other countries
might soon find themselves dealing with their own Microsoft case. The
comparison will also show that the many myths about the United
States' allegedly broad, unilateral access to data around the globe are
misconceived. 74 For instance, the United Kingdom's laws regarding

71.
1987).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (AM. LAW INST.

72.
Id. cmt. f.
73.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 53, at 98 (stating that protective jurisdiction is
hardly exercised in the real world).
74.
See generally Should governments be able to look at your data abroad?,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/
21663902-test-case-set-determine-whether-fbi-can-access-microsofts-foreign-datashould [https://perma.cc/95FU-PCV9] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) (noting the possible broad
powers the U.S. government possesses).
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law enforcement access to cloud data potentially grant UK law
enforcement similarly broad powers. Both laws are silent on the
applicability of any extraterritorial powers. The drafters did not, and
likely could not, foresee the rise in cloud computing. However, how
each country presently justifies the extraterritorial application is a
matter of grave importance for citizens, corporations, and other
countries.
A. U.S. Law Enforcement Access to the Cloud
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), passed in
1986, lays out the statutory framework that U.S. law enforcement
must follow when accessing electronic information. 75 Title II of the
ECPA, the SCA, currently governs the mandatory disclosure of data
held by cloud providers to law enforcement officials. 76 The SCA
provides that third-party Internet service providers ("ISPs") must
disclose customer data to the government, as long as the government
goes through one of three legal mechanisms provided in the statute. 77
Depending on the method used, the government will have to satisfy a
specific legal standard before obtaining authorization to compel an ISP
to turn over customer data. 78 Also, depending on whether the data has
been stored for more than 180 days or not, the government must follow
79
certain procedures.
Law enforcement can only require ISPs to disclose customer
information stored for 180 days or fewer if they apply for a search
warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 0 If the
government applies for a search warrant, it must show a judge that
probable cause exists for the disclosure of the customer's data.8 l This
route provides the most protection to customers when it comes to
the
keeping their data private because probable cause is a high bar for
82
government to meet, and it must be done before a judicial officer.

75.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER), https:l/epic.org/privacy/ecpa/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/73AF-XXAU] (archived Nov. 1, 2016) (providing an overview of the
ways the ECPA allows law enforcement to access electronic records).
76.
Reema Shah, Comment, Law Enforcement and Data Privacy: A ForwardLooking Approach, 125 YALE L. J. 543, 545 (2015)
77.

See

WINSTON MAXWELL

&

CHRISTOPHER

WOLF, A GLOBAL REALITY:

GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS TO DATA IN THE CLOUD 4 (May 23, 2012), http:/!
www.cil.cnrs.fr/CIL/IMG/pdf/HoganLovellsWhitePaperGovernmentAccess
udDataPaper l.pdf [https://perma.cc/487Y-9U2W] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
78.

toClo

18 U.S.C § 2703 et seq. (2012)

79.
18 U.S.C § 2703 (a) (2012)
80.
Id.
81.
Id.; see also MAXWELL & WOLF, supra note 77, at 4 (discussing the legal
mechanism of the SCA).
82.
Orin Kerr, What Legal ProtectionsApply to E-mail Stored Outside the U.S.?,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
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However, for data that is stored for over 180 days, the government
must produce either a subpoena or court order.8 3 With regards to a
subpoena, the government need only establish that it has "reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents are relevant to a criminal
investigation. '8 4 The reasonable grounds standard is easier to prove
than probable cause. 8 5 When the government seeks a court order, the
SCA requires the government to establish "specific and articulable
facts" showing that it has reasonable grounds to believe the electronic
data will be helpful to the investigation.8 6 This standard is essentially
87
the same as the one for obtaining a subpoena.
Despite this lower standard, the SCA provides an additional
protection to cloud service customers if the government seeks a court
order or subpoena. Before accessing the stored data, the government
must give prior notice to the customer.8 8 However, prior notice does not
have to be given if the government can show that providing prior notice
might endanger the life of an individual, increase the risk of flight from
prosecution, increase the risk of tampering with evidence, or otherwise
seriously jeopardize an investigation or trial. 89 Furthermore, prior
notice does not need to be given to the customer if the government's
request is in the form of a traditional warrant. 90 Because the
government can argue that revealing its request will hamper its
investigation, the protection of prior notice might not have any real
"teeth" when it comes to protecting consumer information stored in the
cloud.
Despite these legal mechanisms, the SCA is outdated when it
comes to recognizing current electronic communication and defining
the scope of protections for consumer data. For example, the SCA
requires the government to use one of the legal mechanisms mentioned
above depending on whether the information sought is kept by an
electronic communications service ("ECS") or by a remote computing
service provider ("RCS").91 An ECS is defined as "any service, which
provides users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications. '9 2 Whereas a RCS is defined as "the provision to the

wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mail-stored-outside-the-u-s/ [https:f
perma.cc/GF9U-7LD5] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) (comparing the legal standards of a
traditional warrant versus a subpoena).
83.
18 U.S.C § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) and (d).
84.
Shah, supra note 76, at 545.
85.
See id. (noting that "reasonable grounds" is a lower standard than probable
cause).
86.
18 U.S.C § 2703(d).
87.
Shah, supra note 76, at 545.
88.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
89.
18 U.S.C. § 2705.
90.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
91.
Microsoft Case, supranote 6, at 469 n.2.
92.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
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public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communication system. ' 93 However, as the magistrate judge
in the Microsoft case noted, "[s]ince service providers now generally
perform both functions, the distinction, which originated in the context
of earlier technology, is difficult to apply." 94 Likewise, the line drawn
between requests for data stored more than 180 days and data that has
been stored for less than that is increasingly irrelevant and arbitrary. 95
In today's world, data is routinely kept longer than 180 days, such that
the distinction in the statute has become meaningless. 96
As the Microsoft case has shown, the biggest drawback to the SCA
is its silence on its extraterritorial application and the outer limits on
the government's ability to compel ISPs to turn over consumer data.
As already discussed, much of the case hinged on whether or not the
statute applies to controllers of the information, based on their
location, or whether the statute applies to the physical location of the
data itself 9 While the Second Circuit has found that the SCA does not
apply extraterritorially, the SCA's silence on the matter allows other
circuits to develop opposing interpretations.
Since the start of the Microsoft case in 2014, many commentators
and foreign politicians have expressed concern over the U.S.
government's unfettered power to access data stored anywhere in the
cloud across the globe. 98 The SCA provides for certain procedures that
actually protect consumers' information. For example, the SCA
requires that the government show specific facts to a judicial officer
before compelling an ISP to hand over consumer data. 99 While the
standard might be low, a standard must still be met. However, fears
over the scope of the SCA are somewhat founded considering the global
nature of the Internet today and the SCA's complete silence on the
issue of territoriality. While not perfect, the SCA has analogues in
other countries, including European countries, despite the fact the
European Union has been critical of the SCA and the Microsoft case. 100

93.
18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
Microsoft Case, supra note 6, at 469 n.2.
94.
95.
See id.
96.
See Shah, supra note 76, at 545 ("The distinctions drawn in the ECPA
between communications stored for more or less than 180 days are vestiges of a bygone
era.").
Id.
97.
98.
Sam Thielman, Decision in Microsoft case could set dangerous global
precedent, experts say, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-federal-case-data-security-precedent
[https://perma.cc/ZV8S-Z66X] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) (summarizing the reaction of
many commentators on the potential power of U.S. law enforcement).
99.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
100.
Letter from Viviane Reding, Vice President of Justice, Fundamental Rights,
and Citizenship, European Commission, to Sophie in 't Veld, Member of the European
Parliament (June 24, 2014) (http://www.nu.nl/files/nutech/Scan-Ares-MEP-in%27t-Veld-
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B. UK Law Enforcement Access to the Cloud
Many European countries have derided the United States for its
seemingly broad data interception powers. 1 1 This would lead one to
think that European countries have laws that respect and take
seriously the concept of digital privacy. The European Union does in
fact take seriously the right of every citizen to data privacy. 102 Yet
many EU members have their own domestic laws regarding data
collection that are effectively similar to the powers given to the U.S.
government by the SCA. 10 3 Currently, the main statute in the United
Kingdom that deals with data collection, and cloud data collection
specifically, is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, or
"RIPA."'10 4 An analysis of RIPA's main sections reveals that the UK
government's ability to intercept cloud data is not only similar to the
U.S. government's, but also that RIPA causes many of the same
problems that the SCA does when it comes to the treatment of data
stored in the cloud.
Much like the SCA, RIPA starts out with the broad law that it is
illegal to intercept any communication without lawful authority in the
United Kingdom. 10 5 However, the statute then goes on to describe if
and when there are lawful interceptions of communications.
Underpinning RIPA is the distinction between the terms "interception"
and "communications data."'10 6 This distinction is important because it
10 7
affects the way in which the government's powers can be used.
"Interception" takes place when "the contents of the
communication [are made] available, while being transmitted, to a
person other than the sender or intended recipient of the
communication."10 8 The term "content" is not defined, but it includes

.pdf [https:/perma.cc/UR7G-EVXV (archived Nov. 1, 2016)) (expressing the view that
the extraterritorial application of the SCA might be in violation of international law).
101.
See Kendrick, supra note 13 (discussing the outrage some European have
over US law enforcement capabilities).
102.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, 2000 O.J. C
364/01 [hereinafter Charter of Rights] (indicating that "[e]veryone has a right to the
protection of personal data concerning him or her").
103.
See, e.g., Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter
RIPA].
104.
CLIVE GRINGAS, UK CLOUD COMPUTING INTERCEPTION - NOTHING NEW 2
(2011) http://www.olswang.com/pdfs/CloudComputingInterceptionCQG.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9FZN-RFN9] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
105.
Compare RIPA, c. 1, § 1(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
106.
DAVID ANDERSON, A QUESTION OF TRUST: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY
POWERS REVIEW 95, 6.5 (2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system
uploads/attachment data/file/434399/IPR-Report-Web-Accessiblel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2JC-S74K] (archived Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter UK INVESTIGATORY
POWERS REPORT].
107.
Id. at 6.2.
108.
RIPA, c. 1, § 2(2).
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everything from the actual content of the electronic communication,
like a text message, to the metadata, such as when the message was
sent.10 9 Strikingly, the government has also classified a Google search
as a type of communication. 110 Of equal importance is how the law
defines when a communication is being transmitted. According to
RIPA:
[T]he times while a communication is being transmitted by means of a
telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time when the system
by means of which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted is
used for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it
or otherwise to have access to it.111

This definition of "transmission" is important because it has been
interpreted to mean that voicemails stored on a phone are "in the
course of transmission." 11 2 This principle applies with equal force to
emails stored on a third-party server. 113 Therefore, depending on the
statutory authorizations needed, emails stored on a server somewhere
can be accessed or "intercepted" by UK law enforcement, provided all
other conditions are met.
"Communications data," meanwhile, excludes the content of
communications, and consists of a more limited range of information.
Generally, RIPA defines "communications data" as "data about use
made of a telecommunications or postal service, but not the contents of
the communications themselves." 114 The statute lists three main
categories of communications data: traffic data (such as cell-site data
and certain types of IP addresses); service use information relating to
the use of a particular service (e.g., itemized phone bill); and subscriber
information, which includes any information that a user hands over to
the service provider (e.g., email address, name, and other personal
information required to sign up).115 People familiar with the "Snowden
leaks" might recognize that "communications data" under RIPA is
similar to the term "metadata" that has caused much controversy in
the United States.116

109.

RICHARD KEMP, CLOUD COMPUTING AND DATA SOVEREIGNTY

14 (2015)

http://www.kempitlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Cloud-Computing-and-DataSovereignty.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYMS-KDY8] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
110.
See UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 108
6.52
(commenting on how a Google search is considered communications data).
111.
RIPA, c. 1 § 2(7).
112.
Edmonson, Weatherup, Brooks, Coulson & Kuttner v. R [2013] EWCA Crim
1026 (appeal taken from Eng.).
113.
UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 95 6.5.
114.
Id. at 96, 6.6.
115.
RIPA, c. 2, § 21(4); see also UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supranote
106, at 96, 6.6.
116.
See generally Robert Pritchard, Update Our Legislation on Data and
Security, RUSI (Oct. 31, 2013), https://rusi.org/commentary/snowden-leaks-need-update-
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With regards to the interception of communication content, RIPA
governs which agencies have the power to intercept data and how
broad their powers are. The use of the interception warrants is limited
to M15, M16, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),
the National Crime Agency (NCA), the Metropolitan Police Service, the
Police Service of Northern Ireland and Scotland, Her Majesty's
Revenue and Customs, and the Ministry of Defence. 117 Any other
agency looking to use an interception warrant, or any oversees agency
seeking one through a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), must
request one of these agencies to apply on their behalf. 118 However,
according to the British government, it is rare for a MLAT request to
be filed or authorized, supporting the U.S. government's pessimistic
view of the MLAT process.1 19
An authorization under RIPA is achieved once two requirements
are met. First, the warrant sought must be "in the interests of national
security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime [,] for
the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom," or to give effect to any international mutual assistance
agreement. 120 Second, the secretary of state must believe that the
interception of communications is necessary and proportionate to the
objective sought. 121 This limit is put in place to respect the European
Union's law regarding citizens' right to data privacy, as laid out in the
122
Article 8 case law of the ECtHR.
Interception warrants come in two forms: targeted warrants or
bulk warrants. According to Article 8, targeted warrants must involve
a specific person whose communications will be intercepted or a single
location. 123 According to British officials, these target warrants may
authorize the interception of electronic communication (e.g.,
communications stored in the cloud) between two people in the British
Islands or two people communicating overseas. 124 Meanwhile, bulk
warrants, or external warrants, authorize British law enforcement to
125
intercept communications that are outside of the British Islands.
Specifically, these warrants allow British law enforcement to intercept

our-legislation-data-and-security [https://perma.cc/TA3N-QVZK] (archived Nov. 1, 2016)
(discussing how the evolution of metadata implicates the need to update RIPA, especially
after the Edward Snowden's revelations).
117.
UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 104, 6.38.
118.
Id. at 104, 6.39.
119.
Id.
120.
RIPA, c. 1, § 5(3); KEMP, supra note 109, at 14.
UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 103, 6.37.
121.
Id. at 104, 6.37.
122.
123.
RIPA, c. 1, § 8; see also UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106,
at 104 6.42.
124.
Id. at 105, 6.43.
125.
Id. at 6.45.
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large volumes of data either carried on fiber optic cables or carried by
126
a specific service provider.
The current British laws regarding the access to "communications
data" are in flux due to recent rulings by the High Court. 127 Previously,
electronic service providers were required by law to maintain records
of all users' communications data for at least a year.' 28 Whether the
rule will remain in place is uncertain at the moment. What is known,
though, is that RIPA is less restrictive about law enforcement's access
to communications data. Compared to the limited number of agencies
that could apply for interception warrants, roughly six-hundred
agencies can seek access to a user's communications data. 129
Furthermore, the reasons for applying for the warrant can be
130
broader.
Despite RIPA having been passed almost twenty years after the
SCA's enactment, it too has issues dealing with the rise in cloud
computing and the global nature of the Internet. This has not gone
unnoticed by some officials within the British government who have
recognized that data in the possession of overseas services presents
"unique jurisdictional challenges when UK law enforcement agencies
wish to gain access to [that] data."'131 The British Parliament passed
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA), which
amended and addressed the extraterritorial effect of warrants issued
32
under RIPA.1
For interception warrants, a person (or service provider) is
required to comply with such a warrant whether or not the person is
located in the United Kingdom. 133 The person is not required to take
steps that are not reasonably practicable, and the person does not have
to take steps that might cause them to violate the laws of another
country. 134 Furthermore, under the recently amended RIPA, the
secretary of state may require anyone providing public
telecommunications services to assist with an interception warrant,
35
irrespective of whether or not the provider is in the United Kingdom. 1
The effect might be quite similar to that of the SCA because the cloud

Id.
126.
See KEMP, supranote 109, at 13 (discussing the statutory history of the most
127.
recent RIPA provisions).
128.
Id. at 15.
129.
Id.
6.64
130.
See UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 111,
(describing differences between interception warrants and communications data
warrants).
131.
Id. at 118, 6.95.
Id.
132.
133. RIPA, c. 1, § 11(4).
134.
Id. §11 (5).
135.
RIPA, c. 1, § 12.
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computing service provider might find itself compelled to comply with
a warrant simply because it transmitted user data subject to UK law.
As amended, RIPA seems to suggest that if a company providing
cloud computing services in the United Kingdom, such as Microsoft,
Google, or Amazon, was provided with one of these interception
warrants, cloud computing service providers would be required to take
certain reasonable steps to comply with, and possibly hand over
content data to, UK law enforcement. In regards to communications
data, UK law enforcement can probably require a person or service
provider to provide access to said data, irrespective of the operator's
location, so long as it is reasonably practicable. 136
To date, there have been no cases dealing with this issue of
enforcing these obligations on a service provider overseas. 137 However,
it is not a stretch of the imagination to see how these provisions could
give rise to a case similar to the Microsoft case in the United States.
For instance, UK law enforcement might take a similar stance
regarding oversees data as U.S. law enforcement did in the Microsoft
case. In that case, U.S. law enforcement believed it was reasonable for
Microsoft to hand over overseas communications because Microsoft
could access the data from its U.S. offices. UK law enforcement or the
secretary of state might also think it is reasonable that a public service
provider with an UK office could retrieve overseas data if it was legal
in the United Kingdom. It is uncertain if the United Kingdom will
follow the same path as the United State. However, from this
comparison, it is clear that the United States is not unique in its
approach to law enforcement access to electronic communications.
IV. A TWO-PRONG APPROACH TO ADDRESSING THE ISSUE

This Part will discuss possible solutions to the problem that the
cloud poses in the context of law enforcement access. First, much has
been said about fixing "uncertainty" and providing "stability," but this
Part will explain in more depth why these issues must be resolved.
Second, this Part will argue for a two-prong approach to solving the
issue of law enforcement access concerning the cloud-with a focus on
both a common understanding of which principle of jurisdiction should
be applied in this context and the reforming of the MLAT system.

136.
See generally UK INVESTIGATORY POWERS REPORT, supra note 106, at 119,
6.99 (observing that no case has tested the full extraterritorial effect of RIPA).
137.
Id.
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A. The Consequences ifNothing Is Done
Currently, U.S. companies account for over half of the cloud
computing industry. 138 In 2014, companies spent $72 billion on cloud
computing services globally. 139 However, this state of affairs might not
last long if there is no solution to harmonize or more clearly define the
jurisdictional boundaries of the laws of the United States and other
countries. Since Edward Snowden revealed the National Security
Agency's surveillance practice, cloud computing providers have faced
increasing pressure from European governments to keep the data of
European citizens out of the United States, and instead to "localize"
the data in each European country. 140 The result is that cloud
computing providers have been busy building more and more data
141
centers in Europe.
This movement, dubbed "data localization,"' 142 is troubling and
would undermine the main benefits of cloud computing. 143 First, if
cloud service providers start housing user data in regional data
centers, this would prevent cloud service providers from achieving
efficient economies of scale. As mentioned earlier, cloud computing
works because it allows service providers the ability to pool resources
from processors across the globe in order to achieve efficient economies
of scale and meet consumer demand during peak usage times. 144
Besides restraining cloud computing from achieving its full potential,
other commentators have protested about more than just the negative
economic losses, positing that "[t]he very nature of the World Wide Web

4
138.
James Bourne, AWS, Microsoft, IBM and Google "leave rest behind" in cloud
infrastructuremarket, CLOUD TECH. (July 24, 2015 00:12 AM), http://www.cloudcompu
ting-news.net/news/2015/jul/24/aws-microsoft-ibm-and-google-leave-rest-behind-cloudinfrastructure-market/ [https:Ilperma.cc/S234-PKGQ] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 2015
139.
ToP MARKETS REPORT: CLOUD COMPUTING 3 (2015) http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdfl

CloudComputingTopMarketsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TPG-PTJZ] (archived
Oct. 17, 2016).
140.
Paul Roberts, In wake of Snowden, U.S. cloud providersface calls to wall off
data, IT WORLD (Jan. 27, 2014), http:I/www.itworld.com/article/2699656/security/inwake-of-snowden--u-s--cloud-providers-face-calls-to-wall-off-data.html [https:/!
perma.ccIJH38-W2YM] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
See, e.g., Lisa Fleisher, Apple Spending Nearly $2 Billion on EuropeanData
141.
Centers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2015 8:07 AM) http:Ilwww.wsj.comlarticleslapple-torequired)
(subscription
invest-1-9-billion-in-european-data-centers- 1424685191
[https:/lperma.cc/8FNS-Z7P9] (archived Oct. 17, 2016).
142.
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: DataLocalization vs. the
Global Internet 3-4 (Univ. of Cal., Davis Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 378, 2014).
143.
Id. ("[D]ata localization increases the ability of governments to surveil and
even oppress their own populations.").
144.
See Hossain, supra note 31 (citing resource pooling and rapid elasticity as
basic traits of all cloud computing services).
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is at stake" and that a continued push for data localization laws will
'145
"break up the World Wide Web.
However, this move to localize data would not allay any concerns
Europeans might have regarding U.S. surveillance practices unless
clear jurisdictional lines were laid out. As will be discussed below, the
United States applies different principles of jurisdiction to give its laws
extraterritorial effect than do European countries, such as the United
Kingdom. Thus, localizing data would not protect data stored on a
Microsoft server in Germany if the United States applied its broad view
of the nationality principle, or the effects principle, to Microsoft.
Therefore, a common approach to defining the jurisdictional basis of
laws relating to law enforcement access must be taken in order to
promote a free-flowing trade of information and services, and to ensure
the continued growth of the cloud computing industry instead of
cutting it off.
B. Prong One: Using the Principlesof Jurisdictionto Refocus the Issue
A big part of the debate surrounding law enforcement access to
cloud data is each country's unique perspective and public policy in
applying laws extraterritorially. As the discussion above showed, on
the books, both the SCA and RIPA seem to leave open the prospect that
law enforcement can access data on the cloud, even if the data is located
in another country. 146 However, while many criticize the United States
for its position in the Microsoft case, less attention is given to the fact
that RIPA gives law enforcement in the United Kingdom similar
powers. 147 Thus, how each country has traditionally applied
international jurisdiction principles is important in determining the
potential extent of law enforcement access and whether a common
perspective can be adopted.
How far states stretch their view of the territoriality principle
depends on their respective culture and the overall interests they wish
to advance. 148 For example, the United States and many European
countries view the territoriality principle as a possible justification for
orders of discovery abroad. 149 The current debate and concern around
the Microsoft case is a perfect example of these two differing views. For
instance, according to the magistrate judge in the Microsoft case, the
fact that Microsoft is domiciled in the United States, and has access to
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146.
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147.
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data stored abroad, allows for the application of the SCA without any
150
extraterritorial application.
Indeed, the United States' approach to handling discovery
requests for law enforcement access isdecidedly more unilateral than
other countries. 151 The Restatement even recognizes this difference in
the reporter's comments to Section 442, noting: "[n]o aspect of the
extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier
of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the request
for documents associated with investigation and litigation in the
United States."'152 While this broad view seems to conflict with the
territoriality principle, as the United States is applying its discovery
requests outside of its natural territory, the United States' view is that
the "main acts" of document production are taking place exclusively
within the United States. 153 In theory, U.S. discovery requests abroad
would only violate the territoriality principle if law enforcement agents
sought to enforce these requests within the borders of foreign
territories. 154
Meanwhile, many European countries resort to international
cooperation when it comes to discovery orders for documents located
abroad. 155 As a result, this approach does not give rise to many
concerns in the international context and seems to follow a stricter
interpretation of the territoriality principle when applied to European
rules of discovery. 156 Thus, perhaps one reason for the issue of UK law
enforcement access to data stored abroad might be because of this
cooperative approach.
Both the SCA and RIPA are based on the principle of territoriality
because they place certain obligations on service providers that reside
within their country, regardless of whether or not the service provider
is a domestic national or a foreign national. 157 However, using the
physical location of the service provider as the "jurisdictional hook" of
these laws creates the problems currently playing out in the Microsoft
case. 158 Therefore, one solution is to redefine how the statutes focus on
territoriality. Instead of focusing on the company and its location, one
solution would be to focus on the nationality of the user and where the
159
content is produced, in essence using the nationality principle.

150.
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Microsoft Case, supra note 6, at 474.
Id.; see also CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 60, at 13.
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This approach would be beneficial for several reasons. From an
economic perspective, it would ensure the continued growth of the
cloud computing market worldwide, which would be a boon for the U.S.
technology companies that currently dominate the market. 160 This is
because the incentive for data localization-"requiring foreign
companies to store citizens' data within a country's borders"1 6 '-would
be greatly minimized. 162 Part of the rise in this movement for data
localization is fueled by the desire of governments to protect their
citizens' data from unwanted searches from foreign governments. 163
Thus, knowing that a citizen's nationality determined the effect of a
law like the SCA or RIPA would give these countries peace of mind and
lessen the motivations for data localization. This would also create
more regulatory certainty for companies, thus decreasing any potential
costs arising from the current murky legal environment. Another
benefit is that this approach would still give U.S. and UK law
enforcement the power to compel telecommunications providers to
hand over data, whether it is stored at home or abroad, provided the
data belongs to a national citizen or the data was created in their
64
country. 1
However, for data created by a foreign citizen, law enforcement
would not have the power to compel service providers to give them
access to the data. Instead, law enforcement would have to respect the
MLAT process and request the help of a foreign nation. 165 This
approach would fall in line with the traditional principles of
international jurisdiction and comity. 166 As discussed above,
traditionally, the territoriality principle recognizes that a state cannot
enforce or execute a warrant outside of its boundaries. 167 This new
approach would respect this principle because no country (whether it
be the United States, United Kingdom, or another) would be allowed
to retrieve the data, even if it could be retrieved from overseas in the
home country, without seeking foreign assistance. 168 Relying on this
framework and the MLAT process would acknowledge the sovereignty
of the foreign citizens' government and respect its own principles. For
instance, if the United States went through the MLAT process to
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retrieve the data of a French national, the United States would be
respecting the basic fundamental right to data privacy that EU
members all believe in. 169 Similarly, other countries would not be able
to access the data of a U.S. citizen just because Microsoft has an office
in another country-something that U.S. service providers already
fear. 170 This approach would hopefully strengthen the norms of
international sovereignty and comity to respect the right of each state
to govern its own citizens. Furthermore, it can contribute to repairing
the relationship between the United States and many European
countries over the Snowden leaks and lessen the suspicion many
countries currently harbor against the United States. 171 In return,
other countries would hopefully respect the interests of the United
States in maintaining its citizens' privacy.
Admittedly, there are several problems with this approach. One
problem arises when law enforcement is unable to identify or trace the
user of the data, due to the use of an anonymous IP address. 172 What
should law enforcement do if they are unable to determine with
absolute certainty the nationality of the user? Do they wait and
possibly give up a lead due to their hesitation? Or does U.S. law
enforcement proceed anyway in the hope that the user is a U.S. citizen?
This problem might not be as grim as it sounds due to how
3
sophisticated service providers now are with data location tracking. 17
Service providers most likely know where their user first created the
74
data, so the uncertainty of the nationality of the user is probably low. 1
However, for the most sophisticated criminals, there is still the chance
that they will be able to keep their location and nationality
75
anonymous.1
Finally, a last problem with this approach is its reliance on the
MLAT process. The current MLAT request process is extremely slow,
which is one reason why the United States served the warrant on
76
Microsoft instead of going through the MLAT process with Ireland. 1
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Simply suggesting to focus on the identity of the user or place of data
creation, without also reforming the MLAT system, is to offer a
somewhat utopian, and most likely ineffective solution. Without any
MLAT reform, countries will have no incentive to change their ways
because the MLAT process is too slow for law enforcement to effectively
do its job. Thus, all that will be left is countries making empty promises
and false words about respecting state sovereignty, while covertly law
enforcement uses other means to acquire the sought after data.
Unless there is a binding treaty or other document to hold each
country accountable to focusing on the nationality of the user, there
will be nothing stopping countries from going back on their promises,
except perhaps shame in the international community. As was
discussed above, countries take widely different views on how to
interpret and apply these principles. Who is to say how a country will
interpret the principle regarding a focus on the nationality of the user?
Thus, reforming the MLAT process is critical so that countries feel less
desire to "cheat" and liberally expand the principle to suit their needs.
What MLAT reform must do, and how it could work, will be discussed
below in the next Section.
Other authors have suggested that using other principles of
international jurisdiction might solve some of the problems posed by
the cloud. For example, some have written about applying the
nationality principle to the cloud service providers. 177 Applying the
nationality principle to statutes like the SCA and RIPA would not
serve as a silver bullet to the problem of law enforcement access to
cloud data. Defining a corporation's "nationality" is difficult because it
depends on the frame of reference one takes. A corporation's
nationality can be different depending on whether the nationality is
based on the state of incorporation, majority shareholder nationality,
or other links to the forum. 178 Another issue is raised when a state
attempts to impose its laws on a foreign entity simply because the
foreign entity is a subsidiary of a corporation located within the
state. 179 Under U.S. practice, nationality is determined by the state
that the corporation is incorporated in. 180 Furthermore, the United
States recognizes that foreign subsidiaries of national corporations fall
under U.S. law.' 8 ' Thus, from a U.S. perspective on the nationality
principle, the concept of control can be crucial in determining the scope
of its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws. This principle of
182
control is once again illustrated in the Microsoft case.
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Applying this nationality principle to corporations that offer or use
cloud computing would lead to several issues. One is that currently,
U.S. corporations dominate the global cloud computing market. 183
Therefore, most of the cloud computing industry must comply with
both U.S. law and the domestic laws of the countries in which
businesses operate.' 8 4 Taken to the extreme, applying this nationalitycontrol principle to cloud computing service providers would cause
serious problems for businesses seeking to comply with regulations
abroad, for example, Europe's strict data protection regime.18 5 Thus,
an approach that relies on focusing on the service provider's nationality
is unlikely to serve as an effective solution, especially if a service
provider finds itself falling under the jurisdiction of two countries that
have opposing laws.
Another principle that might be used to justify the extraterritorial
application of law enforcement access statutes is the passive
personality principle.1 8 6 Although, applying this principle to justify the
jurisdiction of domestic regulations over cloud computing companies
abroad would be unlikely. First, there has been fierce criticism over the
passive personality principle since at least 1927. 187 In addition,
applying a passive personality principle to domestic regulations on
cloud computing companies could continue to cause uncertainty.
One commentator has argued for a possible application of the
passive personality jurisdiction on cloud service providers. 188
Assuming a state criminalizes inadequate data protection by the
service provider, an application of the passive personality principle
might be applied in a scenario where it is difficult to determine exactly
where the "harm" occurred, for instance, where there is a data transfer
across multiple jurisdictions and third-party servers.18 9 The state of
incorporation may not have any incentive to bring actions against the
provider, whereas the state of the national harm may have a desire to
protect those abroad. 190 A serious problem arises, though, if all states
seek to apply laws this way. The service provider would face high costs
of uncertainty in determining which legal regimes it must conform to.
Given how easy it is for a person to create a fake account and lie about
their country of origin online, a provider might be subject to a

183.
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jurisdiction it did not expect to be under. If all states apply this
principle, service providers might fear expanding beyond domestic
borders, which would severely hinder the growth of the industry.
In the end, switching the focus on to the nationality of the user
would be a big step forward in bringing laws like the SCA and RIPA
into the twenty-first century. While there are still gray areas and
several downsides in using this approach, it would hopefully lead to
greater international cooperation and reinforce the notion of
international sovereignty.
C. Prong Two: Refining the MLAT Process
In addition to redefining the jurisdictional terms of the SCA and
its international analogues, the second part of a workable solution
would be to reform the MLAT process between countries. 191 If the
process was reformed, countries might have less of a desire to find ways
to execute warrants for data on their own. Many decry the MLAT for
being too cumbersome and time consuming; thus any reform would
have to address the issue of expediency. 192 One group has suggested
that a time limit be tied to the nature of the case at hand, so that
routine matters are given more time while more pressing cases have
an "express lane." 193 Such an express lane is needed, especially in
today's world where cybercrimes are committed with increasing speed.
Another author suggests that the MLAT process should create online
submission forms for all agencies, instead of relying on paper and
email. 194 Of course, this recommendation touches on another area of
improvement for the MIAT process-the need for increased funding to
gather more resources to deal with modern international crime. 195
MLAT reform would also consist of some kind of reciprocity. As
mentioned above, a downside to simply refocusing the territoriality
principle is that it requires that states actually respect each other's
sovereignty. A system that establishes some form of reciprocity would
hopefully decrease the incentive for unilateral law enforcement actions.
Of course, this would only work if both nations promised to exclusively
use the MLAT system. 196 Therefore, another possible solution to further
bolster the usefulness of the MLAT process is to require law enforcement
agencies to use their best efforts to engage in the MLAT system before
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taking unilateral means to achieve their goals, otherwise known as a
"first-use constraint." 197 Going hand in hand with a principle of
reciprocity would go a long way in making the MLAT process an
attractive alternative for law enforcement agencies. 198
In theory, these reforms sound simple; however, putting them into
practice is a harder task. Realistically, it is hard to expect law
enforcement agencies to be able to deal with MLAT requests with the
expediency always required. Therefore, some back door might be
necessary to allow countries to bypass the MLAT process and use more
unilateral measures in some circumstances. 199 Countries could include
in the reformed treaties a term that limits the unilateral measures to
"serious transnational crimes involving imminent threats of death. ' 200
The problem is that this creates the same back door that the SCA and
RIPA already have. How would one define "a serious transnational
crime" and "imminent"? Law enforcement wishing to forgo the MLAT
process could overstate the severity of a crime in order to invoke this
exigency provision. 20 1 This might mean that countries must consult
each other about the case before letting such a provision be invoked.
However, if the crime is indeed serious, there might not be time for
such a consultation. These practical issues are one reason why even
with MLAT reform, states may not fully embrace this solution.
Overall, it is clear that the MLAT process hinders rather than
helps law enforcement. This deficiency has led to countries finding
20 2
ways around it unilaterally at the expense of international comity.
The process must therefore be refined and made efficient so that law
enforcement starts to think of the MLAT process first before using
other routes. As a first step, the MLAT process should have increased
funding and the warrant process should be streamlined. 20 3 Second, the
MLAT system should provide for some form of reciprocity. A strong
norm of reciprocity might encourage countries to resort to the MLAT
process in the beginning of an investigation, instead of finding ways
around it. However, being a norm, reciprocity might not be enough to
encourage states to use the MLAT process if there is no enforcement
mechanism to make sure the states do not cheat.
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V. CONCLUSION
20 4
At this moment in time, cloud computing is the way of the future.
However, its proliferation led to legal headaches, both domestically and
internationally. Opposing laws and regulations already are a headache for
companies that operate across borders. However, with the cloud, there is
less clarity in determining the jurisdictional limits on countries' regulations.
Thus, cloud computing service providers might potentially find themselves
"in the unenviable position of choosing to comply with a U.S. court order or
breaching EU laws."20 5 This scenario, if left unchecked, could cut off the
growth of the cloud industry, affecting not only businesses, but also the
multitude of consumers who now use the cloud every day.
This Note has shown that the United States, applying the SCA, is not
the only nation at fault. Countries like the United Kingdom have similar
laws that allow law enforcement to access cloud data, without speaking on
the issue of extraterritoriality. Thus, the only thing preventing other
countries from also applying their laws extraterritorially is their domestic
policies concerning the importance of international comity. A solution is
needed that provides clarity to countries and corporations, increases
international comity, and decreases diplomatic tensions, and is possible to
attain. Relying on the traditional principles of jurisdiction, the best
approach is for all countries to apply their laws concerning cloud computing
with consideration of the nationality of the user. This would provide more
certainty and lessen the fears of countries that their citizens are being spied
on by other countries. However, to be realistic, the MILAT process must also
be streamlined in order to encourage countries to use the MILAT process
rather than attempt to unilaterally execute an extraterritorial warrant.
While this two-step solution is not perfect by any means, and future
technology may frustrate this approach, it is a good first step. What is not a
good solution is for each country to continue acting alone, for this will leave
everyone else in the dark and remove the benefits cloud computing offers in
the form of global access to one's data.
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